













Nationalism, essentialism and the yearning for national 
"wholeness": Post-colonial constructions of "nation" in 
Indonesia 
Pamela Allen 




Post-colonialist narratives have tended to reject the idea of 
nationalism as a totalising discourse and to allow for it to encompass a 
number of different - even competing - ideologies.  In late 1990s Indonesia, 
however, in the midst of what some may see as the "Balkanisation" of the 
nation, essentialist nationalism still appears to occupy a significant space.  
Take for example the August 1997 editorial of the journal media karya 
budaya, which asked its readers to 
consider the difficulty of ... encouraging (our 
children) to forsake McDonalds or Dunkin Donuts 
and go back to Nyonya Suharti’s fried chicken or 
Palembang fish cakes.  When everything that smacks 
of being "Indonesian" is marginalised, can we still in 
all sincerity, in our 17 August ceremonies, give 
honour to the sacrifice made by our national heroes 
who died in the battle against colonialism and who 
returned Indonesia to her people?1 
    
It is a plea that seeks to privilege an "authentic" form of nationalist 
sentiment over the vulgar commercialism of globalisation, and to achieve an 
identity ‘uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and 
images’. (During 1988, 114) 
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 My paper examines a particular manifestation of this yearning for 
national wholeness: the concern with what Boehmer (1993, 273) calls 
'maternal plenitude'.  Heng (1997, 359n) has pointed out the potent 
symbolism in the appropriation by nationalist movements of women, the 
feminine and figures of gender to anchor nationalist imagery to serve their 
need for self-representational vocabulary: 
The would-be nation is represented, perhaps as a 
cherished "motherland" to be protected and renewed; 
an essential "mother tongue" is recovered and 
promulgated in the nationalist cause; or a selective 
configuration of womanhood, or traditional "mother 
culture", is posited, then defended, by those who 
eventually become the "founding fathers" of the 
nation (which is subsequently "born").  
 
My study focuses on a contemporary example of what may be 
regarded as a potentially recuperative maternalising gesture - Megawati 
Soekarnoputri.  Her symbolic wholeness resides largely in the fact that she 
is the daughter of Soekarno - the self-styled "father of the nation".  As such 
Megawati can be seen to represent a return to what the people see as the 
"true" values of the Indonesian nation, her maternal plenitude expected to 
save her from the sins of her father.     
 However, as my paper will show, the maternalising gesture signalled 
by the ‘Megastar phenomenon’ is ultimately abrogated by her very 
femaleness.  Megawati's name symbolises her status: 'Soekarnoputri' means 
'the daughter of Soekarno'.  She is thereby understood to be an extension of 
the ideology and politics of her famous father rather than a leader in her 
own right.  Furthermore, the prospect of her becoming Indonesia's next 
leader engendered a lively debate in Indonesia on the issue of a female 
President, particularly in the context of Islamic law.  
 What does this suggest about the place of essentialist nationalism in 
a fractured postmodernist age?  I argue that ultimately it cannot deliver what 
it promises: in the late twentieth century the concept of national 
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"wholeness" is too fragile and illusory to survive under the weight of 
entrenched ideologies and historical baggage. 
 
Kartini 
  Shadowing post-colonial essentialist constructions of nationalism in 
Indonesia is the “master narrative” of feminised nationalism - the story of 
Kartini, whose life and thoughts shape the way many Indonesians think 
about both feminism and nationalism.  As Sulastin Sutrisno says in her 
introduction to the Indonesian version of Kartini’s letters, ‘the spirit of 
Kartini continues to inspire Indonesian women of today and the future.’2 
(Sutrisno 1985, XXII)  Jean Gelman Taylor (1997, xiii) describes as 
‘obligatory’ the linking of the name of Kartini with twentieth century 
nationalist discourse.  To quote Danilyn Rutherford (1994, 23), ‘Kartini has 
sparked a conversation which seems unlikely to cease.’  
             Born in 1879, the daughter of a high-ranking Javanese civil servant 
in the Dutch colonial government, Raden Ajeng Kartini was granted by her 
father the unusual privilege of attending a colonial elementary school until 
the age of twelve when she had to follow the Javanese custom and remain 
in seclusion in her father's house.  She spent the next four years reading and 
engaging in prolific correspondence with her Dutch friends, learning in the 
process about the emerging feminist movement in Europe.  Her three 
passions were the education of women, the provision of Dutch language 
education and the provision of technical or vocational education as a vehicle 
for self-development.  Her greatest ambition was to establish a school for 
girls, a project for which she had the support of her family.  However, not 
long after her arranged marriage she died soon after giving birth to her first 
child in 1904, at the age of 21.  She never saw her dream realised.  Her 
project was taken up by her Dutch patrons who established the Kartini 
Foundation and Kartini schools for girls were indeed established, the first in 
Semarang in 1913.   
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             Kartini has come to symbolise many things in contemporary 
Indonesia.  She represents the ideal wife and mother, even though she was a 
wife for a very short period of time and during her time in seclusion had 
been vehemently opposed to marriage, and even though she was only a 
mother for five days (though in her letters she did frequently declare her 
intention to have many children).  She is always referred to as Ibu (mother) 
Kartini, despite her very young age at death.  She ‘embodied the purity of 
the young Indonesian nation’ (Locher-Scholten and Niehof 1987, 5) and 
was granted the honorary title of ibu bangsa (mother of the nation).  (ibid., 
7)  In the Indonesian context, the word ibu covers a wider range of 
meanings than does the word “mother” in English and in fact implies an 
authority transgressing domestic boundaries – as long as the benefits 
accrued from that authority are returned to the family.  It is however an 
unambiguously female authority which is inextricably linked to woman’s 
role as the backstop and supporter of the family, as caretaker of the 
household, as producer of future generations and as the family’s prime 
socialiser. (Sullivan 1991, 64)  This authority derives from an ideology 
which sanctions a woman’s actions as long as she does it as ‘a mother who 
is looking after her family, a group, a class, a company or the state, without 
demanding power or prestige in return.’ (Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, 
1991, 44)  It is an ideology which has underpinned nationalist women’s 
organisations in Indonesia since early in the century.  As  Kathryn Robinson 
(1997, 147) points out: 
The specific concerns of the nationalist’s women’s 
organisations tended to focus on women’s rights as 
wives and mothers, manifested in an abiding concern 
with women’s rights in marriage…This focus has 
been deepened and extended under the New 
Order…in that the predominant trend in policies for 
women has been to focus on their rights and duties as 
wives and mothers, indeed their citizenship being 
defined in terms of their wifely and maternal roles… 
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   April 21, Kartini’s birthday, is a national holiday and young girls are 
encouraged to dress in traditional Javanese costume in honour of the 
occasion and sing the Kartini anthem Ibu Kita Kartini.  Soekarno (who 
officially inaugurated Kartini as a national heroine in 1964) apparently 
changed the name of the song from Raden Ajeng Kartini, indicating her 
unmarried state, to Ibu Kita Kartini, stressing her status as a married 
woman.3  Kartini Day is also celebrated with ‘healthy baby competitions, or 
quizzes testing women’s “wifely” and “motherly” knowledge.’ (Robinson 
1997, 69) 
Discourses on nationalism and feminism in Indonesia are 
inextricably linked with Kartini’s name.  She was, to quote Sitisoemandari 
Soeroto, the ‘mother of nationalism’, ‘a fact which should not upset men 
because, after all, “mothers gave birth to us.”’ (cited in Rutherford 1994, 
34) For many Indonesians Kartini is not simply ‘a symbolic reference point’ 
in discussions of national identity and meaning (Cote 1992, ix); she is the 
reference point.  She has an invisible franchise over the domain.   
However in the last decade there have been suggestions from some 
Indonesian historians that in post-colonial Indonesia it is perhaps 
inappropriate to continue to idolise as a nationalist icon a woman who, after 
all, gleaned her ideas almost exclusively from reading Dutch literature and 
corresponding with her Dutch friend Stella Zeehandelaar.  In the late 1980s 
the historian Harsja Bachtiar sparked a polemical debate when he suggested 
that Kartini’s letters gave an image of her as an educated Dutch woman.  
Furthermore she was a woman who betrayed her own vehement opposition 
to polygamy and arranged marriages by marrying, at her father’s request,  a 
man who already had several wives.  This particular debate led to President 
Suharto himself stepping in to defend Kartini’s status as a national heroine: 
 Haven’t we all unanimously agreed on her status as 
a national heroine4? 
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In short, it appears that Kartini is beginning to be de-essentialised.  
In her 1994 article, Danilyn Rutherford examines the ambiguity of Kartini’s 
place in her own writing, an ambiguity which has led to quite different 
reconstructions of her by, among others, Pramoedya Ananta Toer and 
Sitisoemandari Soeroto.  As Rutherford points out (38), Kartini’s early 
death and the lack of an ‘unequivocal origin’ in her writing makes her 
accessible to and a symbol of, ‘any number of collectivities.’  Selective 
cutting and pasting of Kartini’s writings can turn her into whatever we want 
her to be.   
 
Megawati Soekarnoputri 
When Megawati assumed the role of vice-President of Indonesia on 
October 21 1999, she stood on the podium and said to her followers, 
To my children throughout our homeland, I urge you 
to resume your duties in a spirit of honesty.  Don’t 
get carried away by your emotions, because your 
mother stands before you here on this podium.5 
  
 Her words represent a continuation of both the “mother of the 
nation” idiom symbolised by Kartini and Megawati’s own ideological 
stance: during the election campaign she frequently refered to her followers 
as her ‘children’.   She felt obliged to decline persistent invitations to have a 
meal with her supporters in Jakarta, for example, saying, ‘It will cause too 
much trouble for my children to wait on me.’6   
Like the Kartini legend, the story of Megawati Soekarnoputri has its 
genesis in a yearning for an "authentic" national identity.  In case you have 
missed the media coverage of the Megawati phenomenon, this is Megawati 
Soekarnoputri (photo of Soekarno).  If you need more proof, consider the 
following lively exchange in letters to the editor in July 1999's Jakarta Post.  
The veteran political commentator Herb Feith set the ball rolling by 
suggesting that the Megawati-Amien Rais ticket could be seen as a 
replication of the dwi-tunggal (two-but-one) Soekarno-Hatta team in pre-
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Independence Indonesia, with Megawati representing Soekarno and Amien 
Rais Hatta. (Wahyuni, 1999)  This led to a heated response from a reader 
who declared that 'the only ingredient Megawati has in common with her 
father is her genes' and that furthermore 'Mega will destroy the myth of 
Soekarno when she fails'.  This is turn led to an outcry from another reader 
who asked, 'How could Megawati destroy the myth of Soekarno, her being 
his daughter....she is the reincarnation of her father.'  As an article in the 
Bali Post put it, ‘There is no denying that Mega’s leadership is an extension 
of that of her father.’7  In a comparison with other female leaders, one 
commentator suggested that she was destined to be a far greater leader than 
Cory Aquino, because she ‘has inherited the charisma of her father, Bung 
Karno.’8     
There are two things going on here.  First, Soekarno is being 
reinstated as the "authentic" voice of Indonesian nationalism, the 
intervening 35 or so years being sufficient to sanitise some of the less 
successful aspects of his leadership.  Second, he is being given a female 
voice through his daughter.  There seems to be a sense that being a woman, 
Mega will not be guilty of her father's greatest personal flaw, his 
womanising.  (Soekarno married five times and had innumerable affairs.  
The fact that Megawati has been married three times is rarely mentioned.)  
Her steadfast, womanly nature is emphasised by references to her in the 
press as being ‘mature’ (McBeth 1993), ‘matronly’9 and ‘mild-mannered’. 
(McBeth 1994) 
            The most significant points for the case of my argument for the 
existence of an essentialist feminised nationalist discourse is that she is the 
daughter of the founder of the Indonesian nation.  The symbolism is 
transparent.  Just as discussions of Kartini are variously embedded in 
references to her genealogical links with Javanese kings, her roots in the 
Majapahit empire and her inheritance of the spirit of resistance from her 
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Mataram forefathers10, discussions of Megawati in the media almost always 
invoke references to her parentage - and both her gender and her parentage 
of course are signalled in her very name 'Soekarnoputri', the daughter of 
Soekarno.  She is rarely just 'Megawati'; she is 'Bung Karno's eldest 
daughter', 'the daughter of the Proclamator of the Indonesian Republic', 'the 
daughter of former President Soekarno'.  She was originally approached by 
PDI leaders because they 'wanted to use Bung Karno's name to attract the 
masses.'11 (Levi 1997, 19)  (However, this strategy eventually backfired.  
Soerjadi, the PDI leader wanted Soekarno's name but did not expect 
Megawati herself to present any threat to his leadership - he thought she 
was a humble housewife who didn't understand political machinations.  
Megawati's popularity eventually led to the split of the party with Megawati 
leading the vastly more popular PDI-P).  This underestimation of 
Megawati’s popular support and potential power is a symptom of Sylvia 
Tiwon’s claim (1996, 65), that female power is routinely suppressed in 
Indonesia out of fear of its maniacal force. ‘The notion of female 
participation in power is feared and therefore silenced’ she says, adding, 
It is this suppressed background of the maniac force 
of femaleness that may help to explain the function 
of so many modern women’s organisations in 
Indonesia with their insistence on rankings, the 
emphasis on Ibu as the only appropriate title for 
women.  This channeling of women taps their energy 
and turns them into “motors for development” 
without unleashing the power of the female.   
  
 Since late 1998, prospects of a coalition government between PDI-P 
and Abdurrahman Wahid's PKB foregrounded Megawati's gender.  There is 
considerable disagreement among Muslims and individual ulamas about 
interpretations of the Koran, or more correctly, the Hadith (Mohammad’s 
utterances), on the issue of female leadership.   
The Third Islamic Congress on 6 October recommended that ‘the 
President and the vice president should be male and Islamic, bearing in 
mind the fact that the majority of Indonesians are Islamic.’12  A vigorous 
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dialectic ensued, with various factions within Islam in Indonesia – including 
women’s and intellectuals’ organisations – offering diverse interpretation of 
the Quran on the issue. The most persuasive verse from the Quran (An-
Nisa’: 34 RS1-302) states that ‘Allah decrees that men are the leaders of 
women’.
13
  Those using this as a reason for not allowing a female President 
extrapolated from the Islamic decree forbidding a woman to be an imam (a 
religious leader) over a man to avow that therefore a woman must be 
forbidden to rule over a largely Islamic country, half of whose population 
are men.      
A view put forward by, among others, Nuraini Lubis, chairwoman of 
Muslimah Al-Washiliyah, and Amien Rais, chairman of Partai Amanat 
Nasional was that ‘a woman can become president if there is no male 
suitable for the position.’14 ‘What we need to ask ourselves at this point in 
time,’ said Rais in November 1998, ‘is whether in fact there is no male 
capable of doing the job.’15  The chairman of Dakwah Islamiyah, Chaidir 
Fadhil, maintained that if a devout Muslim woman were offered the 
Presidential position, she should refuse it.16 
The Islamic women’s organisation Muslimah Al-Washiliyah also 
appealed to a broader argument for denying such a leadership role to a 
woman, suggesting that ‘Eastern’ cultures like Indonesia aren’t yet ready to 
take such a step.17 Ohan Sudjana, the leader of Partai Syarikat Islam 
Indonesia, unambiguously stated that a woman cannot become leader of 
Indonesia: 
But she can become number two....the president 
must be a male, while the vice -president can be a 
woman.
18
    
 
The leaders of Nahdatul Ulama, Abudrrahman Wahid's Islamic 
support group, were also engaged in intense discussions about the moral 
and religious implications of a female president right up until the MPR 
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session in October 1999.   A regional PKB leader told Media Indonesia in 
August 1999: 
It could well be that the leaders will give the 
'uncertain' decision to the issue of a female 
president.  And if that is the case it will give the go-
ahead for a woman to pursue the presidency.  It will 
become like the issue of bank interest.  Previously a 
number of leaders regarded bank interest as haram, 
now they accept it even though they still regard it as 
haram.19 
 
Significantly Wahid himself had earlier denounced the decision of 
the October 1998 Islamic congress as ‘very weak’ (sangat lemah) and 
‘indefensible’ (tidak dapat dipertahankan) and went as far as suggesting 
that the decision was politically motivated with a view to dividing Islamic 
support for Megawati.  Wahid’s own position was that ‘in practice it is still 
difficult for a woman to become leader, but theoretically it is possible.’20  
 There is also evidence that the notion of female authority remains 
essentially domestic in character.  There has been some support within 
Islamic organisations for a female President on the grounds that female, 
nurturing qualities would transform the position and the country: 
Because a woman is superior in many respects, such 
as her diligence, her patience, her motherliness, so 
that within our society we would have a situation of 
calmness, tranquility and serenity.21     
 
 
Conclusion                
I have suggested in my paper the existence in Indonesia of a 
particular strain of essentialist nationalism, namely the notion that a 
nurturing, maternal nationalist figure will be Indonesia’s saviour.  I have 
argued that the ‘Mega-star’ phenomenon may be read as an extension of a 
nationalist trope which has its origins in the cult of Kartini.   It is a trope 
which, however, seems to beg to be dismantled.  Kartini’s status as a 
nationalist icon is increasingly being questioned and discussions about 
Megawati’s suitability to take up a leadership position have been couched in 
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terms of the desirability or otherwise of a female leader of a country whose 
population is 90% Islamic.  
 It can be argued that the nationalist essentialism represented by 
Kartini stood the test of time because it was untainted by praxis; she was 
given the status of a national heroine because of her rhetoric rather than 
because of her achievements.  When it started to become clear that 
Megawati represented more than a symbol of a potentially nurturing 
maternal power, when it appeared that she may well assume real power, her 
gender became perhaps the most vexatious issue in her leadership 
ambitions.  We can never know how Kartini’s gender would have affected 
the implementation of some of her far-reaching plans.  Some have gone so 
far as to suggest that it is just as well she died at a young age: she can thus 
be a heroine without representing a threat to orthodox power structures in 
Indonesia.    
In Megawati’s case the essentialist nature of her support may well  
work against her.  The spectre of Soekarno is not a welcome sight to 
everyone in Indonesia; outside Java in particular many in fact fear the rise 
of 'Soekarnoism'.  Others have expressed cynicism about the emotional 
impetus behind the 'Megastar' phenomenon: 
...the support, partisanship and mass sympathy for 
Megawati's candidacy for the presidency seems to be 
emotional and irrational,  a manifestation of support for a figure who was tortured and oppressed by the 
New Order regime.22 
 
It is a cynicism encapsulated in Goenawan Mohamad’s rather caustic 
comment, ‘Suppose she was not the daughter of Bung Karno, she wouldn’t 
be anyone at all: only a housewife with simple thoughts.’ (cited in McIntyre 
1997, 2)  
              Furthermore, if she fails to live up to the expectations enshrined in 
her father's name she may be shunned by her own supporters.  Essentialism 
is an unforgiving discourse.  The name from which she may be seen to 
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derive her credibility, 'Soekarnoputri', signalling her gender and her 
genealogy, may well prove to be her Achilles heel.  
                                                 
Endnotes 
 1
 membayangkan betapa sulitnya mengajak (anak muda) meninggalkan McDonalds atau 
Dunkin Donut untuk kembali pada ayam goreng Nyonya Suharti atau mpek-mpek 
Palembang.  Kalau semua yang berbau Indonesia semakin menepi masih beranikah kita 
mengheningkan cipta mengenang jasa para pahlawan yang gugur dalam mengusir 
kolonialis-imperialis untuk mengembalikan Indonesia pada rakyat, saat upacara 17 
Agustus?’ 2
 semangat Kartini tetap menjiwai perempuan Indonesia masa kini dan masa mendatang 
 4Bukankah kita sudah sepakat menetapkan Kartini sebagai pahlawan nasional? 
For a full discussion of the polemics see ‘Ayunda tidak pernah menyerah’ Tempo 12 
December 1987 5
 Kepada anak-anakku di seluruh Tanah Air, saya minta untuk bekerja kembali dengan 
tulus.  Jangan melakukan hal-hal yang bersifat emosional, karena di dalam mimbar ini, 
kamu melihat ibumu berdiri di sini… Kompas 22 October 1999 6
 Anak-anak saya pasti akan dibuat kerepotan melayani saya.  ibid. 7
 Harus diakui kepemimpinan Mega sekarang tak bisa lepas dari bayang-bayang Soekarno. 
‘Mega, silakan jadi capres’,  Bali Post 7 November 1998  8
 mewarisi kharisma ayahandanya, Bung Karno  ‘”Presiden” Megawati, selangkah lagi…’ 
Bali Post 11 November 1998. 9
 Far Eastern Economic Review August 8 1996 10
 See Rutherford 1994, 27 11
 ingin memanfaatkan nama Bung Karno supaya menarik massa  ('Rakyat berharap 
Megawati muncul') 12
 presiden dan wakil presiden (wapres) seorang pria dan beragama Islam.  Hal ini 
mengingat mayoriats masayarkat Indonesia yang sebaiggian besar muslim.  Kompas 7 
November 1998 13
 Allah berfirman: Kaum laki-laki itu pemimpin bagi wanita. Terbit 10 November 1998 14
 Wanita boleh saja jadi presiden kalau tidak ada pria yang mampu untuk jabatan itu.’ ibid. 15
 Persoalannya, apakah sekarang memang tak ada tokoh yang becus. Bali Post 8 
November 1998 16
 Terbit 28 October 1998 17
 Terbit 10 November 1998 18
 Tapi kalau nomor dua bisa. Presiden...harus laki-laki, sedangkan wakil presiden boleh 
dijabat wanita. 19Bisa jadi, soal presiden wanita ini, ulama akan mengatakan filafiah (ragu-ragu-red).  
Karena keputusan itu filafiah, maka keinginan wanita jadi presiden bisa terus dijalankan.  
Seperti soal bunga bank, sejumlah ulama yang dulunya memandang bunga bank itu haram, 
kini bisa menerima kendati tetap berpendapat itu haram. 20
 dalam praktiknya memang sulit wanita jadi pemimpin, tetapi dalam teori hal ini bisa 
dilakukan.  Bali Post 10 November 1998. 21
 Karena banyak kelebihan, misalnya ketekunan, ketelatenan, keibuan, sehingga di tengah-
tengah masyarakat akan muncul suatu situasi yang adem, tenang dan sejuk  Suara Merdeka 
1 December 1998 22
 ...dukungan, keberpihakan, dan simpati massa kepada Megawati untuk menuju ke kursi 
kepresidenan sekarang ini tampak lebih bersifat emosionil, irasional, dan merupakan 
keberpihakan kepada yang dahulu di era rezim Soeharto merupakan sosok yang digencet 
dan ditindas oleh rezim Orde Baru. ("Ismail Suny: Tak ada larangan bagi mega jadi 
presiden') 
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